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ABSTRACT 
This paper experimentally investigates the framing effects of intertemporal choice using two 
different elicitation modes, termed classical and penal. In the classical mode, participants are given 
the choice between receiving a certain amount of money, smaller and sooner, today and a higher 
amount, larger and later, delayed (e.g., “€55 today vs. €75 in 61 days”). This is referred to as the 
standard mode. In the penalty mode, the participant must give up an explicit amount of money in 
order to choose the smaller and sooner option (e.g., “€75 in 61 days vs. €55 today with a penalty of 
€20”). This is the explicit mode. We find that estimates of individual discount rates are lower in the 
explicit mode than in the standard mode. This result suggests that even very simple information 
about the amount of money one must surrender for choosing the earlier option increases delayed 
consumption. The finding has relevant implications for self-control and long-term planning in 
intertemporal choice.  
 
Keywords: framing, explicit penalty, intertemporal choice, discounting, nudge.  
  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
A decision problem is a problem that can be “defined by the acts or options among which one 
must choose, the possible outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or 
conditional probabilities that relate outcomes to acts” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). 
Despite a decision problem can be formulated in different ways, according to standard models of 
intertemporal (Samuelson, 1937) as well as risky (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) choice, 
the decision-maker should not be influenced by variations in the framing of options when this 
variation does not affect the possible outcomes.  
Experimental research has shown however that standard rational agent models are not 
consistent with a wide range of actual individual behaviours (see Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue, 2002, for intertemporal choices, and Kahneman, 2012, for risky decisions) and that 
different elicitation modes, choices with logically equivalent presentations of the same decision 
problem, affect decision-making processes (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Levin, 1987; Li and 
Xie, 2006; Li, Sun, and Wang, 2007; Lichtenstein, Burton, and Karson, 1991; Loewenstein and 
Prelec, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Accordingly, the rational evaluation of an option 
seems to be affected by its formal presentation (i.e., frame) rather than its final level of wealth. 
Real-life decisions are indeed highly context-dependent (Simonson and Tversky, 1992), a finding 
which has been also supported at a neurobiological level (Louie, Khaw, and Glimcher, 2013; Louie 
and De Martino, 2014). In particular, the framing of decisions is not only due to the formulation of 
a particular decision problem but also to additional factors such as personality traits or individual 
habits and people often seem to not be conscious of their cognitive biases (Kahneman, 2012). 
Nevertheless, the effect of framing holds for real and hypothetical choices and for both non-
monetary and monetary outcomes (Kahneman, 2012; Mischel and Underwood, 1974; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; 1986; Wilson and Daly, 2004).  
To date, framing effects have been mainly investigated in the context of decision-making under 
risk. In particular, all other things being equal, individuals have been consistently found to change 
their preference in the choice between a sure and a risky outcome when the prospects are framed in 
terms of gains or losses. Specifically, people seem to be risk-averse in the gain frame (i.e., a certain 
gain or the probability of winning an amount of money versus the complementary probability to 
winning nothing) but risk-seeking in the loss one (i.e., a certain loss or the probability of losing an 
amount of money versus the complementary probability to losing nothing) (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). This finding is well described by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), a behavioural model for decision-making under risk that takes into 
4 
 
account the fact that people are not perfectly rational nor have complete knowledge and unlimited 
cognitive abilities, as described in classical economic theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947). 
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s theory, the decision-making process can be divided into 
two different steps, namely the framing phase and the evaluation phase. In the framing phase, which 
is prior to the evaluation one, the decision-maker selects the part of the information which considers 
important for the choice. Then, in the evaluation phase, the individual assesses the value of the 
decision problem and finally makes the choice. As a result, framing affects the evaluation of an 
option by subjectively determining the features that are relevant for the subsequent choice and this 
is typically established through a reference point, an outcome which is considered as neutral and 
from which possible outcomes are perceived as positive or negative deviations (and then as a gain 
or a loss, respectively). In prospect theory, the value of a prospect is indeed defined in changes 
rather than final states of wealth. Returning to the example above (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), 
when a decision problem is framed in terms of losses, the reference point is that of having 
something to lose and the opportunity to play the gamble, rather than opting for the certain loss, is 
considered as a positive deviation (sure losses are in fact particularly aversive). This is just the 
opposite in the gain frame. In line with experimental evidence, this implies risk-aversion behaviour 
for gains and risk-seeking choices for losses and indeed the individual value function, which is 
defined on deviations from the reference point, is typically concave for gains and convex for losses 
(see original work for details on theoretical and modeling analysis (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 
and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)). 
The framing effect in risky choice is not limited to the domain of money and it has been also 
found using non-monetary options and in non-humans. For instance, McNeil et al. (1982) observed 
that surgery was more often chosen by using survival, rather than mortality, rate frames (i.e., “the 
one-month survival rate is 90%” versus “there is 10% mortality in the first month”). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) showed that framing a choice in terms of “lives saved” seems to induce risk-
aversion, whereas the decision problem described in terms of “lives lost” tends to increase risk-
seeking behaviours. More recently, Chen, Lakshminarayanan, and Santos (2006) found capuchin 
monkeys’ preference for gain-framed rather than loss-framed gambles, suggesting a possible 
evolutionary explanation for framing. 
In the area of intertemporal choice, which is the focus of this paper, the framing of decisions 
has been also found to bias decision-making, intertemporal trade-off between current and future 
consumption, through different mechanisms (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil, 1989; Loewenstein 
and Prelec, 1992; Read, Frederick, and Scholten, 2013; Stewart, Reimers, and Harris, 2014; Weber 
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et al., 2007; for interesting background information, see Elliott and Hayward, 1998). Again, people 
appear to represent future payoffs as gains or losses from a reference point, but also past or future 
consumption and even others’ choices (Loewenstein, 1988; see also, for instance, Epley and 
Gneezy, 2007). 
In intertemporal choice, the most common experimental decision task is to submit choices 
between receiving a certain amount of money, Smaller and Sooner (SS), today (or in the short term) 
and a higher amount, Larger and Later (LL), delayed (e.g., “$34 tonight or $35 in 43 days”; Kirby 
and Maraković, 1996). This is a choice between two outcomes represented by different sizes and 
available for delivery at two different points in time which can be considered as a standard format 
of decision problems for eliciting discount rates— a measure of the steepness at which individuals 
discount future rewards over immediate ones, from individual choice (Hardisty and Weber, 2009; 
Kirby, 1997; Kirby, Petry, and Bickel, 1999; Weber et al., 2007; Zauberman et al., 2009). The 
individual discount rate is considered as a proxy of the individual impulsiveness according to which 
higher rates correspond to an increasing choice of the sooner than later reward. In fact, people 
consider as less valuable the present value of future rewards as the delay at which the reward is 
available increases and then tend to discount future rewards as a function of delay—that is known 
as delay (or temporal) discounting.  
Decision problems have been represented, however, in different forms and framing effects have 
been found to be involved in the elicitation of discount rates according to the particular format 
chosen. For example, Read and Roelofsma (2003) focused on the difference between standard 
choices and matching modes, framings in which participants are required to state a particular value 
that equal two different options according to their preferences (e.g., “£???? Sept 28, 2001 or £1000 
Sept 27, 2002”). They found increasing discount rates associated with delay, especially in the 
matching frame. Although the difference was not so pronounced, this finding is in line with 
previous research comparing these two conditions (see also Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997; Breuer and 
Soypak, 2015; Malkoc and Zauberman, 2006). 
Other framing effects in intertemporal choice have been found for decision problems using 
calendar dates (Read et al., 2005), age at the time of delivery of the delayed option (Frederick et al., 
2011), or interest rates (Read, Frederick, and Scholten, 2013). The use of rounded numbers, rather 
than decimals, has been also shown to influence the level of impulsivity (Fassbender et al., 2014). 
In fact, people tend to shift their preferences according to features such as choice attributes or time 
construal (Lempert and Phelps, 2016). The framing of decision problems can therefore influence 
discount rates by increasing or decreasing the salience of the outcomes through different choice 
aspects. 
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In line with these findings, as was observed for the standard model of decision-making under 
risk, the normative theory of intertemporal choice has been criticized in favour of more descriptive 
models of discounting future events, especially hyperbolic (Ainslie, 1992; 2001) but also quasi-
hyperbolic (Elster, 1979; Laibson, 1997; Phelps and Pollak, 1968), sub-additive (Read and 
Roelofsma, 2003), additive-utility (Killeen, 2009), or interval discounting (Scholten and Read, 
2006). Specific models of framing have been also proposed (Loewenstein, 1987; Loewenstein and 
Prelec, 1992; Read et al., 2005). For instance, Loewenstein (1987) incorporated the concept of 
reference point into the intertemporal choice model and showed that people tend to be more 
impatient when the options are expressed in terms of delay rather than speed-up (acceleration) 
forms in which the future reward is anticipated (i.e., keep a $7 gift certificate available at an 
appointed time versus trading the same certificate for a smaller, earlier one). A similar situation was 
more recently investigated by Weber et al. (2007). In their study, again, subjects increased their 
discount rates when decision problems were framed in terms of delay (e.g., “receive a $50 Amazon 
gift certificate that day” versus “receive a gift certificate of larger value in 3 months”) rather than in 
terms of speed-up (e.g., “receive a $75 Amazon gift certificate in 3 months” versus “receive a gift 
certificate of lesser value that day”). According to Loewenstein (1988), these shifts of preference 
are due to changes in the reference point. More specifically, since in speed-up modes the delayed 
option seems to be framed as the default option (which is instead represented by the immediate one 
in delay frames), subjects tend to increase their choice for the delayed reward. Reference points can 
be induced by factors as reward proximity or anticipate consumption (e.g., for dieters: eat a caloric 
food now, rather than later; see Ruderman, 1986), which may increase the feeling of deprivation 
and stimulate impulsive behaviour.  
Please note that individuals may be aware that their preferences are subject to contextual 
influences. Because of this, if they are sufficiently sophisticated, they would behave as rational 
economic individuals and provide more analytical evaluation of decision problems in both risky and 
intertemporal choice. Particularly, in intertemporal choice, people may apply pre-commitment 
strategies (i.e., commit in advance to a certain plan of action, such as using deadlines for task 
completion; see for instance Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002) to increase their future orientation, an 
effort which typically requires self-control (Baumeister, 2002; Houben and Jansen, 2011), and 
objectivity in individual decision-making. By reducing the difference between objective and 
subjective components of choice, models of non-standard preferences become more compatible 
with classical theory (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001; Pollak, 1968; Strotz, 1955-56).  
Despite the importance of these alternative models, however, framing in intertemporal choices 
remains only partially explained. This is especially true if we consider the experimental findings on 
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the failure of descriptive invariance of preference in risky choice and the importance of prospect 
theory as a more descriptive model of decision-making under risk. As a result, if experimental 
literature on intertemporal choice is overwhelmingly critical about the use of rational agent models 
in real life decisions and agrees with the link between elicitation effects and shift of preferences, 
framing effects in intertemporal choice need to be further investigated, theoretically and 
experimentally. Consider, for instance, the importance and implications of framing effects for 
intertemporal choices and long-term goals in areas such as retirement, energy consumption, or 
health (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998; Weber, 2004; 2006).  
Accordingly, the main aim of this paper is to experimentally investigate the effect of elicitation 
modes in intertemporal choice by using decision frames where the difference between the SS and 
paired LL option is explicitly indicated to the participants in each decision problem that we called 
an explicit penalty decision problem (e.g., “€75 in 61 days vs. €55 today with a penalty of €20”). 
Decision problems with an explicit penalty will be used and compared to standard modes (e.g., “€55 
today vs. €75 in 61 days”). By using this paradigm, we hypothesise that, by giving test subjects 
simple information about the amount of money the participant has to give up for choosing the 
smaller and sooner option, individuals tend to shift their preferences in favour of the LL option, and 
then increase their tendency to be more future-oriented. Specifically, we speculate that the explicit 
penalty may act as a nudge; that is, an indirect suggestion influencing decision-making without 
coercive measures (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), that leads individuals to be more far-sighted. 
Successful long-term planning has been found to be connected with the ability to anticipate future 
events, by foreseeing the pleasure/pain connected with possible future events, and, at the same time, 
to resist immediate or short-term temptations. Anticipation and self-control, together with 
representation, are indeed three key features of intertemporal choice which interact each other 
through mechanisms (already identified and new ones) that are presently only partially explained 
(Berns, Laibson and Loewenstein, 2007). Accordingly, people may reduce their level of impatience 
throughout attention or other cognitive mechanisms that should be further investigated, possibly by 
using neurobiological data in an interdisciplinary approach. Here, we do not intend to present a new 
mechanism of choice but rather to shown how people can be gently pushed into far-sighted 
decisions by making explicit simple information (and then slightly changing their perspective), in 
accordance with the spirit of nudge.  
Similar formulations to our explicit penalty decision frame have been investigated in the 
literature. Namely, Marzilli Ericson et al. (2015) used the following formulations: “$5 today vs. $5 
plus an additional $5 in 4 weeks” and “$10 in 4 weeks vs. $10 minus $5 today”. Less recently, 
Read, Frederick, and Scholten (2013) reported results from compatible framings asking participants 
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“Would you prefer to receive $700 now or invest it for 1 year for an additional $42?”. To date, 
however, very similar modes to penalty in intertemporal choice are speed-up modes (e.g., as seen 
above, “receive a $75 Amazon gift certificate in 3 months” versus “receive a gift certificate of 
lesser value that day”) or decision problem formulations with explicit reference to opportunity 
costs. Notably, opportunity costs rely on the fact that people have to think about the pleasure 
associated with the outcome but also consider other alternative resources, items or experiences, that 
could give them the same pleasure (see Buchanan, 2008; Carmon and Ariely, 2000; Eatwell, 
Milgate, and Newman, 1998; Henderson, 2014). As for intertemporal choice, the opportunity cost 
of time effect was investigated by Zhao et al. (2015). In their paper, they explicitly referred to the 
opportunity cost of time by using this formulation: “At the expense of one day of studying time, 
participate in an extracurricular activity for one day tomorrow” versus “At the expense of two days 
of studying time, participate in an extracurricular activity for two days in a week”. They found that 
respondents were more likely to choose the LL option when the opportunity cost was hidden (i.e., 
no reference to opportunity costs), whereas the SS one was the most preferred in the explicit 
condition. Frederick et al. (2009) also investigated the role of opportunity costs in intertemporal 
preference but with monetary choices and purchasing decisions, which may have activated different 
processes of choice, especially if considering the types of goods at stake. Hidden-zero effects (e.g., 
“$5 today and $0 in 26 days OR $0 today and $6.20 in 26 days”; Magen, Dweck, and Gross (2008)) 
have been even considered as drawing attention to the opportunity cost of each choice and 
encouraging to select the option with the lower opportunity cost (i.e., the more delayed one). In line 
with this view, this type of framing has found to account for the decrease of impatience in 
intertemporal preference.  
However, our approach is basically different from both opportunity costs and the other 
formulations here identified. As for opportunity costs, firstly, Zhao et al. investigate the opportunity 
cost of time rather than money. The same authors emphasize the difference between monetary 
rewards and availability of time, which has not always a positive connotation. Secondly, an 
opportunity cost is not necessarily considered as an actual loss or penalty and, indeed, opportunity 
costs may also consider the positive sides, such as pleasure or benefit, associated with giving up a 
certain outcome. Moreover, in the processing of opportunity costs, stronger inter-individual 
difference may apply (Frederick et al. 2009; Zhang, Ji, and Li, 2017).  
As for the other similar formulations, particularly the explicit-zero format but also the others 
reported above (i.e., “$10 in 4 weeks vs. $10 minus $5 today”, “Would you prefer to receive $700 
now or invest it for 1 year for an additional $42?”, or “receive a gift certificate of lesser value that 
day”), they still remain quite different from our penalty approach, especially because they require at 
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least a minimum of numerical computation which is absent in our explicit penalty frame. Indeed, 
with the type of framing we employed here, individuals are explicitly indicated the amount of 
money they have to give up in case of preference of the SS option. As a result, in respect to other 
less explicit modes, results should not be affected by errors, or at least misrepresentations, when 
evaluating the prospect of choice. Expected utility considerations can indeed be complex for 
individuals, even when simple calculation is needed (Kahneman, 2012).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next three sections, we present three 
experiments on intertemporal choice and framing effects in which we compare the standard 
decision problem version with an explicit penalty mode and evaluated the effect of penalty in 
intertemporal choice by using both hypothetical (Study 1) and real (Study 2 and 3) monetary 
amounts. In the final section, we address the discussion of findings, limitations of the study, and 
suggestions for future research. 
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2. Study 1: Hypothetical decisions 
 
2.1. Methods 
 
A total of 135 undergraduate students (64% females; age range, 19 to 20 years) from the 
Department of Law, and Political, Economic, and Social Sciences at the University of Piemonte 
Orientale participated in the experiment by completing an online survey. The survey was available 
to the students for a duration of 15 days at a link within Moodle, an electronic learning 
environment. All participants provided informed consent and were not compensated for their 
participation in the study. 
Participants were presented a series of intertemporal choices between two different monetary 
options. For each choice, subjects’ preference was elicited by asking participants to choose between 
a hypothetical immediate option SS, available at time t, and a larger delayed option LL, at time t+1 
(e.g., “€8 today vs. €11 in 1 week”). The SS option was the same on all trials (€8), and it was 
immediately available (t = today). The respective amounts for the LL options were 8.5, 9, 9.5, 10, 
10.5, 11, 11.5, 12 Euros. The delay for LL options (t+1) was fixed and indeed it was available after 
a delay of two weeks in every choice. 
Two different questionnaires were prepared. The standard questionnaire contained standard 
decision problems (“Would you prefer €8 today or €11 in 1 week?”). In the explicit penalty 
questionnaire, the amount of money the subject has to give up for choosing the SS option was 
instead explicitly indicated (“Would you prefer €11 in 1 week or €8 today with a penalty of €3?”). 
Half of participants were then randomly assigned to either standard version or to the explicit penalty 
mode. 
 
2.2. Results  
 
The percentage of subjects choosing the SS option was higher in the standard version than in 
the penalty mode. Specifically, there was a difference of 7 percentage points (24% versus 17%) 
between the two questionnaires and the difference was found to be statistically significant (Fisher 
exact test, p-value <.01).  
A multiple logistic regression analysis (SS vs. LL options as the outcome variable) including 
gender, reward size and type of questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty) as independent 
variables was also performed (we did not include the variable delay into the analysis since there was 
only one possible delay). Type of questionnaire and reward size were significant at different levels 
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(p-value <.01 and <.001, respectively). Results are summarized in Table 1. The power test indicated 
a power of 0.98 (significance level = 0.05; effect size = 0.15) (Analysis was performed in Ri368 
3.2.2, developed by the R Foundation for Statistical Computing (R Core Team, 2015), with the pwr 
package (Champely, 2017; effect size benchmarks by Cohen, 1988)). 
The results of this pilot study appear to indicate a higher tendency towards more immediate 
rewards in the standard framing, rather than in the explicit penalty format, and then suggest a 
difference between the processing of the two questionnaires (standard vs. explicit penalty). This 
finding seems to hold regardless the use of real or hypothetical monetary amounts and standardized 
questionnaires, as we show in the two following experiments. 
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3. Study 2: Weak monetary incentives 
 
3.1. Methods 
 
Three experimental sessions were run for a total of 241 undergraduate students (68% females; 
median age: 22.99, SD: 1.85). Sessions were conducted at the IULM University of Milan, 
Department of Law, Economics and Business, and at the University of Siena, Department of 
Economics and Statistics, between December 2015 and April 2016. All participants provided 
consent prior to participation. 
 
3.1.1. Protocol 
At the beginning of each session, the researcher informed participants that they were 
participating in an experiment on individual decision-making and also explained that their responses 
would remain completely anonymous and at an aggregate level. Then, each subject was 
administered a self-report monetary-choice questionnaire, available in pencil-and-paper form, in 
two versions. Specifically, half of participants were randomly assigned to either the standard 
version or to the explicit penalty version of the self-administered questionnaire. At the end of the 
questionnaire, participants were asked to report their age, degree program, and gender. 
Each session lasted around 20 minutes and was performed under identical conditions, using the 
same methods. All subjects participated in only one session of the study.  
Some of the participants in each session were randomly selected to receive one of the reward 
they stated to prefer in the questionnaire. At the end of the session, indeed, one question was 
randomly chosen to be paid and the selected participants received their reward according to their 
choice in that chosen question. The selected subjects were paid for the same choice. Immediate 
payments were paid in cash at the end of the experimental session. For future rewards, instead, 
subjects were individually met in their classroom at the number of days needed and paid in cash at 
no transaction cost. Because of this payment scheme, participants were told that they would make 
each choice as if it was the one they will receive as reward.  
 
3.1.2. The Monetary-Choice Questionnaire 
Subjects participated in the experiment by completing the 27-item Monetary-Choice 
Questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby, Petry, and Bickel, 1999), a self-administered questionnaire which is 
typically used in experimental studies to elicit individual discount rates (see, for instance, 
Duckworth and Seligman, 2005 and, more recently, Kowal and Falkener, 2016; Richman et al., 
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2015), and which is based on the questionnaire developed by Kirby and Maraković (1996). In the 
standard version of the MCQ, participants were presented a series of intertemporal choices between 
two different monetary options. For each choice, subjects’ preference was elicited by asking 
participants to choose between an immediate option SS, at time t, and a larger delayed option LL, at 
time t+1 (e.g., “Would you prefer €55 today or €75 in 61 days?”). The SS option was immediately 
available (t = today), whereas the delay for LL options (t+1) was between 7 and 186 days. The 
possible amounts for the SS reward were ranging from 11 to 80 Euros, whereas the respective 
amounts for the LL options were between 25 and 85 Euros. Participants were requested to select 
their preferred option by circling an alternative for each choice of the questionnaire. 
As noted earlier, a second version of the MCQ was prepared in which the amount of money the 
subject has to give up for choosing the SS option was explicitly indicated (e.g., “Would you prefer 
€75 in 61 days or €55 today with a penalty of €20?”). This version was considered as the explicit 
penalty mode questionnaire. 
Following Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999), subjects’ discount rates are estimated from their 
choices throughout the questionnaire by applying the formula V= A/(1+kD), where V is the present 
value of the delayed amount A at delay D and k is a parameter identifying the discount rate. This 
formula is of hyperbolic type (Mazur, 1987). As noted earlier, the hyperbolic model is an alternative 
to the normative model of intertemporal choice that has been found to be more descriptive of 
individual discounting by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) than discounted utility 
theory. It is not the aim of this paper to enter into a discussion concerning forms of discounting 
describing individual preference in intertemporal choice (see, for instance, Kirby and Maraković, 
1996; see also Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002 for a review). However, according 
to this particular equation, an individual who is indifferent between 11 Euros today and 30 Euros in 
7 days has a discount rate of 0.25 (for additional details about the computation of subjects’ discount 
rates, the reader may refer to Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999)). As stated in the introduction, the 
discount rate can be considered as a measure of individual impatience and self-control (Benzion, 
Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989; Herrnstein, 1981; Rachlin, 1992; for impulsivity see Ainslie, 1975; 
Rachlin and Green, 1972). Indeed, since the discount rate reflects the tendency to choose immediate 
versus delayed rewards, it decreases the value of an option as the delay increases or in other words, 
as the individual discount rate increases, the individual discounts the future more heavily and tends 
to choose more immediate options. The discount rate is here computed for both standard and 
explicit penalty questionnaires with the aim of comparing the level of impatience in the two modes 
and then testing for possible differences in our framing of choice. 
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All the choices included in the questionnaire are shown in Appendix A. The order of the 
questions follows that in Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999) which was designed to prevent any 
correlation between SS and LL options in terms of amounts, ratios, differences, delays, or discount 
rates. The participants were instructed following the instructions in Appendix B, which were 
adapted from Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999). Particularly, they were instructed about what they 
would be paid, in the standard as well as the explicit penalty framing, if they were selected for the 
reward payment. For instance, in the explicit penalty frame, this was used to avoid 
misunderstandings about the possibility to receive €55-€20=€35 today (rather than €55) in the 
choice “Would you prefer €75 in 61 days or €55 today with a penalty of €20?”. Prior to beginning 
the experiment, participants were questioned to make sure they understood the instructions. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
The main objective of the study was the testing of possible elicitation effects in intertemporal 
choice by using different decision frames. Specifically, we investigated the question whether a 
penalty effect occurs when the amount of money the individual has to give up in order to choose the 
more immediate option in the decision problem is explicitly mentioned. We applied a between-
participants design in which participants were asked to complete the standard monetary-choice 
questionnaire or, alternatively, the penalty mode. 
The analysis was based on individual discount rates which were elicited from the two different 
monetary-choice questionnaires (i.e., standard and explicit penalty modes), but also covered 
subjects’ willingness to choose later options and information related to demographic characteristics 
of participants. The demographic information was indeed analysed in terms of individual difference 
variables. Additional attributes of choice options, such as magnitude and delay, and consistency of 
results were also examined. 
Results were analysed using Ri368 3.2.2, developed by the R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing (R Core Team, 2015), and the analysis was performed by means of non-parametric 
methods due to the characteristics of the sample. In particular, differences were tested for statistical 
significance by the Fisher exact test, a nonparametric test of independence for the relationship 
between two variables, and the Wilcoxon two-sample test for unpaired observations. This test is 
used for comparison between different groups and is the statistically equivalent to the Mann-
Whitney U test. We also computed additional analysis, such as randomization tests, to evaluate the 
robustness of the main treatment effects, which were preliminary tested in the pilot study.  
15 
 
Table 2 summarizes the main descriptive results and characteristics of the sample by 
questionnaire. 
 
3.2.1. Demographic information, general data 
Participants age ranged from 20 to 31 years old (mean age = 22.99; SD = 1.85). The median age 
was comparable in the two groups and indeed the median age was 23.09 (SD = 1.98), in the classic 
MCQ, and 22.88 (SD = 1.71), in the explicit penalty MCQ. 
As for gender, 32% of the subjects were males and the rest 68% were females. Specifically, the 
number of females was higher in the first two sessions (88% vs. 12%, in session one, and 75% vs. 
25%, in session two), but lower in the last one (45% vs. 55%). Despite this, the percentage of 
females was only slightly higher in the explicit penalty mode questionnaire (71%) than in the 
standard MCQ version (66%) (not significant). Thus, we decided to investigate for potential gender 
differences in the comparison of the two questionnaires. 
The number of standard and explicit penalty questionnaires was also quite similar for each 
session. The percentage of classical MCQ delivered was indeed 49%, in the first session, and 51%, 
in the second and third ones. Age was likewise comparable across sessions, since the mean age 
computed for the three sessions were 25 (SD =0.98), 23 (SD =1.69), and 21 (SD =1.08), 
respectively. These results suggest a substantial homogeneity within the three different sessions.  
As for subjects’ choices, we firstly checked what percentage of participants selected the more 
immediate option in each of the two questionnaires. As a result, most of subjects preferred the LL 
rather than the SS option in both modes. However, the percentage of subjects choosing the SS 
option was higher in the standard version than in the penalty mode of the MCQ and indeed there 
was a difference of 9 percentage points between the two questionnaires (percentage of SS options: 
43%, in the standard MCQ, and 34%, in the explicit penalty mode). The difference between the 
choice of LL and SS options in the two modes was found to be statistically significant by means of 
the Fisher exact test (p-value <.001; Table 3). This result suggests that individuals tend to switch 
towards the more delayed option when the amount of money subjects have to give up is explicitly 
indicated. 
Second, the choice of the SS option was slightly higher for males than females in the explicit 
penalty monetary-choice questionnaire (38%, for males, and 31%, for females; p-value <.001). The 
percentage of SS options chosen in the standard questionnaire was instead the same for both 
females and males (43%; not significant) (Figure 1). This result clearly indicates that, despite the 
percentage of preference for the non-delayed option was higher in the standard version of the 
questionnaire for both males than females, the effect of using an explicit penalty in the decision 
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problem was higher for females than males. Indeed, females reduced more than males the choice of 
the SS option in the explicit penalty version of the questionnaire. 
Conversely, the choice of SS options was comparable across sessions in the explicit penalty 
mode, but not in the classical version of the monetary-choice questionnaire. The percentage of SS 
preferences was indeed between 39% and 45% in the standard MCQ (p-value <.05) and around 33-
35% in the explicit penalty MCQ (not significant). The main results of this section are summarized 
in Table 2. 
 
3.2.2. Discount rates 
The individual discount rates were separately calculated for standard and explicit penalty 
questionnaire, using a tool developed by Kaplan et al. (2014). Due to the number of non-responses, 
however, it was not possible to compute discount rates for 11 subjects. 
Estimates of individual discount rates were lower in the penalty mode than in the standard 
framing. The mean discount rate was indeed 0.0214 for the standard MCQ and 0.0103 for the 
explicit penalty mode questionnaire. This result was consistent across the different sessions and 
gender groups. Results are summarized in Table 2. 
The difference between discount rates elicited for individuals responding in the two different 
questionnaires was found to be significant different by using the Wilcoxon test (p-value <.01; Table 
3). This result, which is in line with descriptive data analysis in section 3.1, further suggests that 
when participants are explicitly informed about the amount of money one has to give up for 
choosing the earlier option, they significantly exhibit less impulsive behaviour and tend to delay 
consumption by selecting more often the LL option than subjects in the standard condition (i.e., 
57% vs. 66%). This result confirms the claim that information given in the explicit penalty version 
of the MCQ increases the level of self-control, or at least leads people to be more patient, in 
intertemporal choice. 
 
3.2.3. Consistency and magnitude effects 
Consistency of elicited discount rates was assessed by computing the proportion of subjects’ 
choices, given throughout the questionnaire, that were consistent with the assigned discount rate. 
Particularly, the percentage of choices in line with the discount rate computed for each subject were 
calculated. As a result, mean consistency scores for the two questionnaires were 93.62%, for the 
standard version of the MCQ, and 92.33%, for the explicit penalty one, indicating that there was an 
overall high consistency in assigning discount rates in both framings (please note that a consistency 
of 94% reveals that more than 25 out of 27 choices were consistent with the participants’ assigned 
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rate; see Kirby, Petry, and Bickel (1999)). These mean scores were not significantly different, thus 
indicating that consistencies were quite similar in the two questionnaires. 
Subjects’ responses were also analysed in respect with the magnitude of the monetary option, 
delay difference between SS and paired LL options, and the amount of money subjects have to give 
up in case of preference of the SS option (i.e., explicit penalty). 
First of all, the percentage of SS preferences was increasing with delay for both standard and 
explicit penalty version of the monetary-choice questionnaire (Figure 2) and decreasing with the 
amount of money subjects have to give up in case of preference of the SS option (Figure 3). The 
trend is, however, more clearly defined in this second case. The difference between the percentage 
of SS options chosen by participants in the two questionnaires was not significant in these two 
analyses.  
As for magnitude of the monetary reward, the percentage of the SS options for the two 
questionnaires were both decreasing with the amount of the LL option. This result suggests that 
subjects tend to decrease their level of impatience as the monetary reward increases. This is not 
surprising since the magnitude of a reward tends to be considered as a positive attribute of the 
decision problem (Lempert and Phelps, 2016). The decrease was similar, in percentage terms, in the 
two versions of the questionnaire, although the result of the analysis was only slightly but 
significantly different (Wilcoxon test, p-value <.05). Also, subjects tested by the explicit penalty 
questionnaire seems to be more patient, since they are more likely to delay gratification for each LL 
amount (Figure 4). This is in line with the results of the discount rates analysis and, again, 
descriptive data. 
With the aim to further investigate this result, participants’ discount rates were also calculated 
for small, medium and large rewards sizes (i.e., 25-35 Euros, 50-60 Euros, and 75-85 Euros, 
respectively). As a result, we found that participants discounted small magnitudes more rapidly than 
medium and large ones in both elicitation modes (Table 2). However, they discounted money more 
rapidly in the standard MCQ than in the explicit penalty mode for each of the three reward sizes 
(Figure 5). All these differences resulted to be statistically significant at the Wilcoxon test (Table 
3). Namely, the test produced a p-value <.01 when testing the difference between discount rates 
obtained for small reward sizes in the two questionnaires. The p-value decreased to <.001, for 
medium reward sizes, and raised to <.05, for large ones. This result is consistent with previous 
studies using the monetary-choice questionnaire (e.g., Hendrickson, Rasmussen, and Lawyer, 2015) 
and also agrees with magnitude effects in intertemporal choice (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue, 2002). 
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By means of discount rates computed for small, medium, and large reward sizes, we also 
computed a geometric mean—which is less sensitive to variation of magnitude, of the participants’ 
discount rates. Then, we used these discount rates to compare individuals responding in the two 
versions of the MCQ. Statistical significance was confirmed at p-value <.01 (Wilcoxon test; Table 
3). 
To evaluate the robustness of the main treatment effect (i.e., change in discount rate in the two 
questionnaires), we performed additional analysis including the following: random blocked design, 
permutation test, and cluster analysis. First, personal characteristics of the sample as well as 
possible session effects on the main treatment outcome, change in discount rates, were tested by 
using randomized block design. The results were not significant (p-values were: 0.48, for gender, 
0.96, for age, and 0.85, for session). Second, the distribution-free permutation test, which is also 
based on randomization, confirmed a p-value of <.01 for the observed difference between the 
explicit penalty and the standard version of the monetary-choice questionnaire, previously tested by 
means of the Wilcoxon test. Third, we performed a hierarchical cluster analysis (cluster package by 
Maechler et al., 2016) to identify two clusters which were extracted from the discount rates 
computed for each subject, independently of the type of questionnaire they were assigned to. As a 
result of the cluster analysis, 68% of subjects were classified in their actual questionnaire group 
(standard vs. explicit penalty). Moreover, the two obtained clusters were compared with the actual 
treatment assignment in the sample (standard vs. explicit penalty; see Experimental design section) 
and we found no significant difference (p-value=1), suggesting a comparability between the results 
of the two allocations (i.e., clusters analysis and actual distribution of the two types of 
questionnaires). 
We also ran a multiple logistic regression analysis, with the outcome variable being the choice 
of SS vs. LL options explained by personal characteristics (i.e., gender and age), location of 
sessions, reward size (for SS and LL options separately) and delay of options, and type of 
questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty). Type of questionnaire, reward size, and delay resulted 
significant at p-value <.001. Gender was also significant (p-value<.01), whereas no effect was 
observed for location and age. Results are summarized in Table 4. The power test indicated a power 
of 0.99 (significance level = 0.05; effect size = 0.15) (as for the pilot study, refer to Champely, 
2017; Cohen, 1988). The results of the logistic regression tend to confirm the statistical significance 
of the main treatment effect and the importance of variables such as reward size and delay in the 
choice between the two different monetary options. No location effects were instead observed. 
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4. Study 3: Strong monetary incentives 
 
4.1. Methods 
 
A total of 68 undergraduate students (78% females; age range, 19 to 20 years) from the 
Department of Law, and Political, Economic, and Social Sciences at the University of Piemonte 
Orientale participated in the experiment by completing an online survey within Moodle, an 
electronic learning environment. The survey was available on a fixed date and all participants 
provided informed consent. 
Participants were presented a series of intertemporal choices between two different monetary 
options. Choices were defined by using the same methods as the pilot study (see section 2.1), except 
for the delay of the LL option which in this experiment was available after a delay of four weeks in 
every choice. As for the previous studies, two different questionnaires were prepared: standard 
(“Would you prefer €8 today or €11 in 1 week?”) and penal (“Would you prefer €11 in 1 week or 
€8 today with a penalty of €3?”).  
Again, half of participants were randomly assigned to either standard version or to the explicit 
penalty mode. However, in this experiment, all participants were compensated for their 
participation in the study. Specifically, one question was randomly chosen to be paid and the 
participants received their reward according to their choice in that chosen question. Please note that 
for each individual participant, a different random decision was extracted. For both immediate and 
future payments, subjects were individually met in their classroom and paid in cash at no 
transaction cost. Because of this payment scheme, participants were told that they would make each 
choice as if it was the one they will receive as reward. 
 
4.2. Results 
 
Again, the percentage of subjects choosing the SS option was higher in the standard version 
(26%) than in the penalty mode (16%; Fisher exact test, p-value <.01).  
In line with the pilot study, a multiple logistic regression analysis including gender, reward size 
and type of questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty) as independent variables was performed. 
All variables were significant: gender (p-value <.05), questionnaire (p-value <.001), and reward 
size (p-value <.001) (Table 5). The power test indicated a power of 0.77 (significance level = 0.05; 
effect size = 0.15) (as for the pilot study, refer to Champely, 2017; Cohen, 1988). Please note that 
this experiment has been conducted with a smaller number of subjects. 
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The results of this additional study further suggest that the main finding (i.e., the increasing 
preference for the more delayed option in the explicit penalty questionnaire and the difference 
between the two different elicitation modes) seems to hold not only regardless the use of 
hypothetical (study 1) or real (study 2) monetary amounts but also making the incentive more 
meaningful by paying all subjects for their participation in the study. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The main aim of this paper was to investigate elicitation effects in intertemporal choice by 
using decision frames where, in case of preference for the SS option, the amount of money one has 
to give up was explicitly indicated and to make a comparison with the decision frame most 
commonly used in experimental literature. 
The main finding was that the preference for the more delayed option was higher in the explicit 
penalty questionnaire than in the classical version with both real and hypothetical monetary 
rewards. The finding that participants were more patient in the penalty mode, rather than in the 
standard elicitation method, was confirmed by the computed discount rates also for each reward 
size. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals tend to shift their preferences in 
favour of more delayed options and then decrease their levels of impulsivity, when an explicit 
indication about the amount of money one has to give up for choosing the smaller and sooner 
reward is shown. Despite the arithmetic computation of the explicit penalty in each decision 
problem was relatively easy, and indeed the penalty varied between 1 and 54 Euros, the explicit 
reference to that amount triggered a shift of preference towards larger but later options, at least 
compared to controls, in the standard version of the questionnaire. Then, the explicit penalty 
appears to be used as a kind of a gentle nudge leading individuals to be more future-oriented.  
A nudge is defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). In particular, a nudge has been intended to be applied 
in environments characterized by complex decisions with lack of immediate feedback and 
difficulties in predicting or anticipating future events as in intertemporal choice. A nudge should be 
designed to give salience to certain behaviours or options, although the individual should be free to 
discard additional information, such as in this particular case (the idea that similar cues can be used 
in order to manipulate self-control problems is not new. In the domain of framing, see for instance 
Strotz (1955-56) and (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)).  
According to the normative economic theory in intertemporal and risky choice, the rational 
evaluation of a prospect should be merely guided by utility considerations. However, as noted in the 
introduction, evaluation of utility can be complex, even in case of simple assessment (Kahneman, 
2012). Rather than identifying a different mechanism of choice, our penalty mode seems to ease this 
assessment and improve individual rationality during decision-making by explicitly giving the 
amount of money subjects have to give up in case of preference of the SS option.  
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In our experiment, by simply displaying the arithmetic difference between the SS and the 
paired LL option, subjects appeared to be more future-oriented and available to wait for larger but 
later rewards. This result is consistent with previous empirical research that the normative principle 
of description invariance does not seem to hold at a behavioural level. In this specific context, 
individuals appeared to be more patient in the explicit penalty than in the standard version of the 
MCQ and there are different possible reasons for this. First of all, the explicit penalty scenario 
might have lead subjects to be more reflective in their consideration of the reduction in the reward 
amount, as a negative aspect, connected with the choice of the SS option. 
But the scenario might also have placed the subject in a context of loss. In general, the delay of 
a reward can be considered as a loss for the decision-maker’s point of view. Nevertheless, this 
effect might be stronger in the explicit penalty questionnaire than in the standard decision mode. 
Indeed, the default option is typically represented by the SS option, in classical decision problems, 
but by the delayed reward, in alternative modes such as speed-up frames (Loewenstein, 1988). As 
noted in the introduction, in speed-up modes, subjects are first given the opportunity to choose a 
future reward and later provided with the possibility to select an earlier option of lesser value 
(Weber et al., 2007). In similar contexts, the individual has been found to perceive the delayed 
reward as her\his own and hence feel in a frame of loss, rather than gain, in selecting the earlier 
option while giving up the later one (see Lempert and Phelps, 2016). As a result, with respect to 
standard decision modes, waiting can be less aversive (Berns, Laibson and Loewenstein, 2007). 
Zhao et al. (2015) also reported similar results using opportunity costs. Loss aversion can thus be 
viewed as a possible way through which people increase their level of patience by choosing more 
often the LL option over the SS reward. Since speed-up modes are different but consistent with our 
description of the decision problem in the explicit penalty framing, this hypothesis seems to be 
plausible for explicit penalty modes as well. Moreover, loss aversion might be here further 
enhanced by explicitly indicating the monetary difference between the two possible options. Choice 
attributes are indeed more general in speed-up decision problems than explicit penalty ones, 
considering that the amount of reduction for the SS option is not explicitly specified (“receive a gift 
certificate of lesser value that day”; Weber et al., 2007). 
The size of the effect from each of these two components, reference points and choice 
attributes, should be further investigated in future research; in the meanwhile, a similar context of 
explicit penalty can be regarded as a form of nudge for long-term planning and for stimulating 
behaviours, such as saving for retirement or solid investment decisions, but also in helping in the 
context of intertemporal preferences and of self-control depletion, including addiction and 
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gambling. For instance, empirical studies have been consistently reporting that many individuals are 
aware of the fact that they need to save more (e.g., Loewenstein, Prelec and Weber, 1999). 
In this study, we also observed that the effect of using an explicit penalty in the decision 
problem was higher for females than males. Considering that males have been typically found to be 
less risk-averse that females (Powell and Ansic, 1997), the fact that females seem to be more 
affected by this type of elicitation method may be also connected with loss aversion. However, 
since the study population is not well balanced between males and females, further research is 
needed to better understand this gender effect. 
Furthermore, participants discounted small magnitudes more rapidly than medium and large 
ones in both elicitation modes. This is the magnitude effect, a well-established result in 
experimental research on intertemporal choice for which small outcomes are discounted more than 
large ones (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989; Frederick, 1996; Thaler, 1981). The 
difference between medium reward sizes in the two questionnaires was more significant than small 
and large sizes. The reasons underlying this difference should be also further investigated. It is 
worthwhile to note here that the medium sizes included in our experiment may be more easily 
compatible with real-life situations, at least considering a study population of students. 
As for limitations, in this study we used the monetary-choice questionnaire as a tool which is 
typically used in experimental studies to elicit delay discounting. Nevertheless, the use of this 
particular questionnaire may be criticized for, at least, two main reasons. Firstly, individual discount 
rates would be more precisely computed by using adjusting procedures in which the amount of the 
reward and the delay are both adjusted according to the participant’s choices during the experiment 
(Myerson, Baumann and Green, 2014). Alternative methods, including the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak procedure (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964), second price auctions (Kirby, 1997), 
convex time budgets and a number of different multiple price list formats (Andersen et al., 2006; 
Andreoni, Kuhn, and Sprenger, 2015), have been applied in experimental economics. Nonetheless, 
most of these procedures are more often used to measure risk attitude and willingness to pay rather 
than elicit individual discount rates or, at least chronologically, found later application in time 
preference (Andersen et al., 2006; Manzini, Mariotti e Mittone, 2008). Moreover, each experimental 
procedure has its pros and cons (and one may speculate that each framing condition is influenced in 
the same, or compatible, way by the chosen method of elicitation). It is not the aim of this paper to 
enter into a detailed discussion. As for experimental tasks in measuring delay discounting, the 
interested reader is referred, for instance, to da Matta, Gonçalves, and Bizarro (2012) (see also 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002). However, the discount rates elicited by means of 
the delay discounting task developed by Kirby and his colleagues have been found to be reliable 
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and stable over time (Kirby, 2009; Myerson, Baumann and Green, 2016). These types of tasks have 
been also cited to be effective in determining individual differences in delay discounting (Madden 
and Johnson, 2010). In addition to this, the MCQ is a validated monetary discounting measure that 
has been widely used to assess discounting in the laboratory (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue, 2002), not only in experimental economics but also in a wide range of fields in the 
cognitive science. In fact, the version that we used for our main experiment—that is the 27-item 
MCQ, is listed in the Cognitive Atlas, a collaborative project that aims to provide a knowledge base 
for cognitive science (Poldrack et al., 2011). As a result, we considered this tool as a valid method 
to investigate delay discounting, also in terms of reproducible research. Secondly, following Kirby, 
Petry, and Bickel (1999), discount rates were calculated using hyperbolic discounting. Despite the 
hyperbolic method has been found to be more descriptive of individual’s discounting than the 
classical utility theory model of intertemporal choice (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 
2002), this formula has been also criticized in its applicability in different contexts (e.g., Rubinstein 
2003). Moreover, despite future orientation and self-control are two fundamentally distinct 
concepts, and indeed time orientation has specific elicitation methods (e.g., Consideration of Future 
Consequences Scale; see Strathman et al., 1994), we here used these two concepts as related. 
Specifically, in this study, far-sighted decisions are described by both self-control, elicited by means 
of discount rates, and future orientation, reflected by the subject’s willingness to choose later 
options. To date, the two notions are mainly linked in various areas of research (Bembenutty and 
Karabenick, 2004; Daly, Delaney, and Baumeister, 2015; Moffitt, 2011; Seginer, 2000; Takahashi, 
2005). Accordingly, future orientation has been consistently found to have a significant role in the 
control of behaviour and those having problems of self-control tend to be more impulsive with their 
decisions and less future-oriented. For instance, the problem of self-control has been described by 
referring to an individual with two different selves: “a far-sighted “Planner” and a myopic “Doer.” 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 42). Also, we have previously reported that future orientation is an 
effort which requires self-control. Finally, as a more general note, caution should be taken when 
interpreting the choice of LL options as a measure, direct as well as indirect, of self-control. The 
choice of larger options can be indeed a behavioural tendency, which is commonly reported in non-
humans, rather than a delay tolerance (see Paglieri, 2016).  
Important open issues remain to be addressed. Namely, this experiment should be replicated 
using a task involving losses, rather than gains, as choice options. The issue of incentive should be 
carefully addressed in such an experiment; meanwhile, understanding contextual influences in a 
negative framework would be interesting to check how levels of self-control and impulsivity change 
in a framework of monetary loss but also to test for gain-loss asymmetry and other anomalies of the 
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classical discounted utility model which have been empirically observed for positive and/or 
negative outcomes (Faralla et al., 2011; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002). A field 
experiment testing the effect of a little piece of information, such as an explicit penalty, in real-life 
decision contexts (e.g., investment and saving decisions of professionals as well as general 
population) would be also more interesting. 
In light of these considerations, and despite the number of studies that have previously focused 
on elicitation modes, the study of framing effect in judgment and decision-making is far from being 
complete. This paper was intended to provide some additional insight into the incentives for far-
sighted decisions in intertemporal preferences using the effect of framing as a possible nudge to 
increase individual rationality and overcome self-control problems driven by time-inconsistent 
preferences. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary data: Monetary-Choice Questionnaire. 
Monetary-Choice Questionnaire: Standard Version 
For each of the next 27 choices, please indicate which reward you would prefer: the smaller reward 
today, or the larger reward in the specified number of days (please circle the preferred option). 
1. Would you prefer $34 today, or $35 in 186 days? 
2. Would you prefer $54 today, or $55 in 117 days? 
3. Would you prefer $78 today, or $80 in 162 days? 
4. Would you prefer $28 today, or $30 in 179 days? 
5. Would you prefer $47 today, or $50 in 160 days? 
6. Would you prefer $80 today, or $85 in 157 days? 
7. Would you prefer $22 today, or $25 in 136 days? 
8. Would you prefer $54 today, or $60 in 111 days? 
9. Would you prefer $67 today, or $75 in 119 days? 
10. Would you prefer $25 today, or $30 in 80 days? 
11. Would you prefer $49 today, or $60 in 89 days? 
12. Would you prefer $69 today, or $85 in 91 days? 
13. Would you prefer $19 today, or $25 in 53 days? 
14. Would you prefer $40 today, or $55 in 62 days? 
15. Would you prefer $55 today, or $75 in 61 days? 
16. Would you prefer $24 today, or $35 in 29 days? 
17. Would you prefer $34 today, or $50 in 30 days? 
18. Would you prefer $54 today, or $80 in 30 days? 
19. Would you prefer $14 today, or $25 in 19 days? 
20. Would you prefer $27 today, or $50 in 21 days? 
21. Would you prefer $41 today, or $75 in 20 days? 
22. Would you prefer $15 today, or $35 in 13 days? 
23. Would you prefer $25 today, or $60 in 14 days? 
24. Would you prefer $33 today, or $80 in 14 days? 
25. Would you prefer $11 today, or $30 in 7 days? 
26. Would you prefer $20 today, or $55 in 7 days? 
27. Would you prefer $31 today, or $85 in 7 days? 
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Monetary-Choice Questionnaire: Explicit Penalty Version 
For each of the next 27 choices, please indicate which reward you would prefer: the smaller reward 
today, or the larger reward in the specified number of days (please circle the preferred option). 
1. Would you prefer $35 in 186 days, or $34 today with a penalty of $1? 
2. Would you prefer $55 in 117 days, or $54 today with a penalty of $1? 
3. Would you prefer $80 in 162 days, or $78 today with a penalty of $2? 
4. Would you prefer $30 in 179 days, or $28 today with a penalty of $2? 
5. Would you prefer $50 in 160 days, or $47 today with a penalty of $3? 
6. Would you prefer $85 in 157 days, or $80 today with a penalty of $5? 
7. Would you prefer $25 in 136 days, or $22 today with a penalty of $3? 
8. Would you prefer $60 in 111 days, or $54 today with a penalty of $6? 
9. Would you prefer $75 in 119 days, or $67 today with a penalty of $8? 
10. Would you prefer $30 in 80 days, or $25 today with a penalty of $5? 
11. Would you prefer $60 in 89 days, or $49 today with a penalty of $11? 
12. Would you prefer $85 in 91 days, or $69 today with a penalty of $16? 
13. Would you prefer $25 in 53 days, or $19 today with a penalty of $6? 
14. Would you prefer $55 in 62 days, or $40 today with a penalty of $15? 
15. Would you prefer $75 in 61 days, or $55 today with a penalty of $20? 
16. Would you prefer $35 in 29 days, or $24 today with a penalty of $11? 
17. Would you prefer $50 in 30 days, or $34 today with a penalty of $16? 
18. Would you prefer $80 in 30 days, or $54 today with a penalty of $26? 
19. Would you prefer $25 in 19 days, or $14 today with a penalty of $11? 
20. Would you prefer $50 in 21 days, or $27 today with a penalty of $23? 
21. Would you prefer $75 in 20 days, or $41 today with a penalty of $34? 
22. Would you prefer $35 in 13 days, or $15 today with a penalty of $20? 
23. Would you prefer $60 in 14 days, or $25 today with a penalty of $35? 
24. Would you prefer $80 in 14 days, or $33 today with a penalty of $47? 
25. Would you prefer $30 in 7 days, or $11 today with a penalty of $19? 
26. Would you prefer $55 in 7 days, or $20 today with a penalty of $35? 
27. Would you prefer $85 in 7 days, or $31 today with a penalty of $54? 
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Appendix B. Supplementary data: instructions (adapted from Kirby, Petry, and Bickel 
(1999)). 
Standard Version 
Please take the choices seriously: they may be for real money. After you complete the 
questionnaire, a number of subjects will be randomly chosen to be paid for one of their choices in 
the questionnaire. The selected subjects will be paid for the same choice. Specifically, at the end of 
the session, one question will be randomly chosen to be paid and the selected participants will 
receive their reward according to their choice in that chosen question. For example, if the question 
number one will be randomly chosen (i.e., “Would you prefer $34 today, or $35 in 186 days?”), the 
extracted participants will win whatever their answered to that question of the questionnaire. If they 
had circled the smaller reward on that question, they will get $34 today, otherwise they will get $35 
in 186 days from now. Immediate payments will be paid in cash at the end of the experimental 
session. For future rewards, we will join you, in the classroom, at the time your payment will be 
due. Because of this payment scheme, to make sure that you get the reward you prefer, you should 
answer every question as though it were the one you will win. 
 
Explicit Penalty Version 
Please take the choices seriously: they may be for real money. After you complete the 
questionnaire, a number of subjects will be randomly chosen to be paid for one of their choices in 
the questionnaire. The selected subjects will be paid for the same choice. Specifically, at the end of 
the session, one question will be randomly chosen to be paid and the selected participants will 
receive their reward according to their choice in that chosen question. For example, if the question 
number one will be randomly chosen (i.e., “Would you prefer $35 in 186 days, or $34 today with a 
penalty of $1?”), the extracted participants will win whatever their answered to that question of the 
questionnaire. If they had circled the smaller reward on that question, they will get $34 today, 
otherwise they will get $35 in 186 days from now. Immediate payments will be paid in cash at the 
end of the experimental session. For future rewards, we will join you, in the classroom, at the time 
your payment will be due. Because of this payment scheme, to make sure that you get the reward 
you prefer, you should answer every question as though it were the one you will win. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of smaller, sooner options (%SS) chosen by gender and type of 
questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty monetary-choice questionnaire – MCQ). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of smaller, sooner options (%SS) chosen by participants according to the 
delay difference between the smaller, sooner option and the paired larger, later one by type of 
questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty monetary-choice questionnaire – MCQ). 
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Figure 3. Percentage of smaller, sooner options (%SS) chosen by participants according to the 
amount of money subjects have to give up in case of preference of the smaller, sooner option 
by type of questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty monetary-choice questionnaire – 
MCQ). 
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Figure 4. Percentage of smaller, sooner options (%SS) chosen by participants according to the 
amount of the larger, later (LL) option by type of questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty 
monetary-choice questionnaire – MCQ). 
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Figure 5. Discounting across small, medium, and large magnitude of reward sizes by 
questionnaire (standard vs. explicit penalty monetary-choice questionnaire – MCQ). 
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Table 1 Logistic regression results (study 1) 
 Estimate     SE z value    P 
(Intercept) 0.02900 0.18222 0.159 0.87354 
gender (base = female) -0.03906 0.16303 -0.240 0.81064 
questionnaire (base = standard) 0.45834 0.15763 2.908 0.00364** 
reward size 0.51215 0.07194 7.119 1.08e-12*** 
*p <.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 2 Main descriptive results and characteristics of the sample by questionnaire (standard vs. explicit 
penalty monetary-choice questionnaire – MCQ) (n = 241) 
Variables  Standard MCQ Explicit penalty MCQ 
Median age 
23.09 (s.d. 1.98) 22.88 (s.d. 1.71) 
Sex 34% male; 66% female 29% male; 71% female 
Participants’ choice of the small, 
sooner (SS) option 
43% 
43% males, 43% females 
39% 1st; 44% 2nd; 45% 3th session 
34% 
38% males, 31% females 
33% 1st; 35% 2nd; 33% 3th session 
Discount rate 
0.0214 
0.0277 males, 0.0181 females 
0.0136 1st; 0.0221 2nd; 0.0258 3th 
session 
0.0103 
0.0089 males, 0.0105 females 
0.0119 1st; 0.0117 2nd; 0.0066 3th 
session 
Discount rate for small, medium 
and large reward size 
0.03519 (small) 
0.02107 (medium) 
0.01845 (large) 
0.02480 (small) 
0.01109 (medium) 
0.00866 (large) 
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Table 3 Standard versus explicit penalty monetary-choice questionnaire: summary of significance test 
results (main significant variables) 
Variables  P-value 
Participants’ choice of the small, sooner (SS) option <.001 
Discount rate <.01 
Discount rate for small, medium and large reward size <.01; <.001; <.05 
Discount rate (geometric mean) <.01 
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Table 4 Logistic regression results (study 2) 
 Estimate      SE z value    P 
(Intercept) 0.324986 0.520750 0.624 0.5326 
gender (base = female) -0.237352 0.075619 -3.139 0.0017** 
questionnaire (base = standard) 0.637300 0.066563 9.574 <2e-16*** 
location (base = Milan) 0.076000 0.089472 0.849 0.3956 
age 0.011011 0.021199 0.519 0.6035 
reward size (SS option) -0.043735 0.006866 -6.370 1.89e-10*** 
reward size (LL option) 0.055578 0.005660 9.819 <2e-16*** 
delay -0.019655 0.001228 -16.002 <2e-16*** 
*p <.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 5 Logistic regression results (study 3) 
 Estimate     SE z value    P 
(Intercept) -0.03893 0.25831 -0.151 0.8802 
gender (base = female) 0.57823 0.28915 2.000 0.0455* 
questionnaire (base = standard) 0.93040 0.23441 3.969 7.21e-05*** 
reward size 0.42733 0.10124 4.221 2.43e-05*** 
*p <.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
